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Footer Logo

IMPORTING THE AMERICAN DREAM: JAPANESE
HARDWARE AND SOFT POWER
By Kenneth S. Klein
The deep and penetrating impact of Japanese products, whether
economic or cultural, challenges America-centric assumptions about
globalization. While most people think of globalization as something
America did to the world, globalization can also be defined as what Japan
did to America. 1 The value of studying Japanese imports can also be
seen in their continued and ubiquitous presence in American life: from
Nintendo Games; to Honda Civics; to character goods such as Pokemon
and Hello Kitty; as well as the rising interest and respect enjoyed by
Japanese animation. In fact, the purchase and use of Japanese goods in
recent American history became so common that when public awareness
spiked in the early 1990s, it created a widespread sense of anxiety now
known as the “Japan Panic.” For over three decades, consumers had
failed to notice, or chose not to care about, just how many of their goods
came from Japan. Suddenly, they panicked. But clearly, something had
convinced them to buy. Therefore, the strategies Japanese companies
used to reach American markets, as well as the changing nature of the
goods and services themselves, are all worth considering.
Japanese products and services succeeded in post-war American
culture and business through a focus on adaptation that downplayed their
origins and emphasized, whenever possible, quality above all else,
redefining what Americans expected from Japanese imports. Throughout
this process, two major trends nuanced it. First, Japanese products
initially struggled to be taken seriously, and Japanese companies only
embraced their national identities after their products had been
sufficiently associated with quality. Secondly, Japanese imports evolved
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from being associated mostly with hardware to being equally, if not
increasingly, associated with software. This represented a major shift in
what Americans assumed a Japanese import could be.
At this point it is important to define software since there is a
social and technical definition. For example, as games industry expert
Casey O’Donnel argues, game making involves far more than computer
software, so much so that she titles her essay “This is not a Software
Industry.” 2 However, she clearly intends a technical definition, and
O’Donnel’s main point seems to be to clarify that game making is more
than computer coding. Meanwhile, Japanese cultural expert Frederick
Schodt’s use of the term is social in intent and refers to products of
culture like art and entertainment. In arguing that Nintendo excelled in
software and changed opinions about Japan’s ability to produce software,
this paper assumes the social definition.
The story of the American consumption of Japanese goods can
be told from any object or service that started in Japan and found its way
to the United States. This paper will focus on a few major items, from
the late 1950s to the turn of the millennium, with special focus on the
1980s and 1990s. These items include the Japanese monster icon
Godzilla, the early import animation Astro Boy, Japanese electronics
giant Sony, Nintendo video games and game systems, and Japanese
baseball players Hideo Nomo and Ichiro Suzuki’s careers in Major
League Baseball (MLB). Though it may seem odd to include Nomo and
Suzuki in a list otherwise made up of material goods, the idea is that it
was their skill as athletes as a service and as entertainment that was
imported. Likewise, it will be shown that their careers were part of the
same economic and cultural contexts that effected all Japanese imports.
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As Japanese cultural expert William Tsutsui makes clear,
creating a place for Japanese media within American culture has been a
long-term process. 3 Godzilla and other early imports set the stage,
“unnoticed,” for later influxes of Japanese culture. 4 This is important
because it supports the larger idea that many Americans did not always
know they were consuming Japanese culture and that when they did, they
did not take it very seriously. It also creates a wide time frame that
acknowledges Japanese pop culture imports as far back as the 1950s
instead of beginning with more recent trends such as games and anime.
A CBS poll in 1985 asked 1500 Americans to name a famous
Japanese person. The top three answers were Hirohito, Bruce Lee, and
Godzilla. 5 How did this happen? By 1985 Godzilla had literally become
a household name, but his strange journey into American pop culture also
warped him into something funnier than intended. This in turn, meant
that many Americans first experienced Japan as a source of entertaining,
but laughably cheesy culture. 6
In 1958 the Japanese horror movie Gojira came to American
theaters as Godzilla: King of Monsters. To its credit, the original Gojira
was made to be legitimately scary. It also hoped to say something about
public concern over nuclear proliferation, environmental decay, and the
shadow of WWII. 7 While Gojira drew significant inspiration from
American films like King Kong (1933) and The Beast from 20,000
Fathoms (1953), it set itself apart with a more nuanced story, unique
special effects, and emotional intensity. 8 After its domestic premiere,
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Japanese commentators celebrated, with one saying “Gojira makes me
proud that Japan can produce something of this quality.” 9 Unfortunately,
this particular perception of quality did not translate as it relied on
serious themes that were cut from the American version.
Unsurprisingly given its dark, post-war nuclear themes, the uncut
version of Gojira contained some anti-American elements, such as wartime Rising Sun flags and a soundtrack that evoked imperial war
marches. Likewise, the finale of the film firmly establishes that Japan,
and not the world, has triumphed over the threat. 10 Yet when Godzilla
premiered at Loew’s State Theater in 1958, Americans audiences
received a heavily edited retelling. Themes of nationalism and war were
removed. 11 Goofy dubbing that failed to sync with Japanese actors was
added. 12
This did not stop Godzilla from bringing money to American
businessmen and cheap fun to American audiences. Thanks to the
suburbanization of America, which hurt downtown cinemas, and antitrust laws against big studios in the 1950s, smaller studios began to
flourish by spinning out cheap B-movies to fill drive-in theaters.13
Godzilla and its numerous sequels proved the perfect match for the
drive-in and its core audience of working class families with kids and
teenagers. Neither the drive-in owner nor the fans worried much about
the cheesy quality of the films.14
In fact, theater owners often played up the wacky reputation
Godzilla had gained in the United States. Publicity stunts, like posting
movie ads next to demolished building or giant footprints leading up to
the theater, flourished. 13 And yet, precisely because of the gimmicks and
cringe-worthy translations, Godzilla created its own kind of success.
9
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Terrible dubbing even became integral to the experience. 14 This was a
good early example of “localization,” or the process of adapting and
presenting a product in the best way possible for its new market.
Interestingly, it was the American version that was sent to Europe and
other global audiences. In this way, the lousy edits actually helped the
movie spread by linking it to American distribution channels. 15 In the
end, clever adaption helped Godzilla transcend its lost-in-translation
cheesiness by presenting its goofiness as a good thing.
Television syndication was also vital to Godzilla’s early spread.
As Henry Saperstein, a veteran of Godzilla localization, attests, a
Godzilla film had been on the air somewhere in America every week
from 1960-1995. 16 And in this way, Godzilla found a permanent place in
the American psyche. This same Saturday television spot would also give
life to what would become one of Japan’s most important media exports:
animation.
On September 7, 1963 NBC premiered Astro Boy, an animated
show for kids about a boy-like robot who adventured and battled villains.
Animation expert Susan Napier argues this made 1963 “perhaps the most
important date in Japanese animation history.” 17 It was the first weekly
Japanese television show, animated or otherwise, to ever be shown in the
United States.20 While it eventually became a ratings success, most
children watching it had no idea it was Japanese. 18 Meanwhile back in
Japan, people were thrilled that a small piece of Japanese culture was
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well-received abroad because to them, that meant Japan was beginning to
recover culturally and economically as a nation.19
Astro Boy was the brain child of Japanese artist Osamu Tezuka,
best known for his work writing and illustrating Japanese-style comics
called manga. Though he lived off the success of his comics, animation
was his passion. Disney works such as Bambi and Snow White stood
among his favorites, and by the end of his life he had seen them 90 and
50 times respectively. 20 However, the harsh cultural and economic
conditions of post-war Japan forced and inspired Tezuka to create works
quite different from his inspiration.
During the occupation years, the heavy emphasis on rebuilding
through technology encouraged Tezuka to explore questions about man’s
relationships with machines. 21 So in late 1962, when Japan’s Fuji
Television made Tezuka an offer to animate his comic Astro Boy for a
weekly show, Tezuka jumped at the chance. Yet widespread austerity
measures left Tezuka and his colleagues with few resources to work with.
These severe conditions also affected the animation itself. To make up
for both time and money, Tezuka’s Mushi studios chose to make their
show in a style known as limited animation. 22 In short, artists used about
half as many drawings per second of film as normal. Realism suffered,
but as Schodt argues, Tezuka and his team, without fully realizing it,
pioneered the unique priorities and tactics that would later define
Japanese Animation. To overcome lost realism, Tezuka put extra effort
into story-telling, developing characters, and emotional impact. 23 This
caused the development of Japanese animation to take a different path
than its western inspiration via more mature content, and complex plots
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with long running stories. 24 Though Astro Boy quickly became a
nationwide success in Japan, narrow contracts kept Tezuka from making
much profit off the show. However, there was one giant “untapped”
market: the United States. 25
Fred Ladd, the man who localized the show for NBC, recalls that
he was first attracted to show because it reminded him positively of
Pinocchio. Likewise, he thought a story of boy trying to find his place in
the world could resonate with American viewers. 26 However, the version
of the show that NBC viewers enjoyed, much like Godzilla before it, was
heavily edited. Ladd eventually travelled to Japan to explain some of the
changes to the Mushi staff. He wanted them to know that cultural
differences were being edited out, not mistakes. Censored content
included violence, cruelty to animals, depictions of African Americans,
drugs, religious content, and nudity. According to Ladd, the hardest part
of localization was downplaying the violence. 27 For example, if Astro
walked up to a body on the street and said “look, he’s dead” in Japanese,
he would say “He’s unconscious, get him to the hospital!” in English. So
while some content was lost in translation, Astro Boy was able to
introduce American viewers to the format and unique quality of Japanese
animation, even if they didn’t know why it was different.
While Godzilla and Astro Boy were filling TV space, Sony was
quietly setting up shop in New York, planning for the day when Japan
would be known for quality above all else. Unlike Godzilla which never
truly escaped its comic role, or Astro Boy, whose Japanese identity
remained obscure for years, Sony would find a way to deliver unironic
quality that became associated with Japan.
In 1953, Sony leader Akio Morita set out on an international
business tour to study foreign markets. While in Germany, he was teased
24
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by a waiter who pointed to a miniature umbrella on a plate and said, “this
was made in your country.” Morita later claimed that this moment
motivated him to use Sony to push Japan beyond being associated with
“cheap imitations and trinkets.” 28 Yet the early leaders of Sony also
assumed they could not effectively compete in old markets, especially
back in Japan where their rival Matsushita dominated domestic
electronics sales. 29 Sony’s goal then became to bring high-tech goods to
foreign markets, not just because that made good business sense but also
because Morita was determined to prove “made in Japan” was a good
thing and “not a badge of shame” like he felt it had become. 30
Morita created the name Sony specifically to help the company
reach international markets. Morita explained that he wanted a name
without any existing meaning, a word that could be intermixed with any
language. He was also inspired by the old Latin meaning of “sonus” or
sound. He then combined that sound with the Japanese slang turn sōnnyboy, which communicated youth and cleverness. Between the two, he
created Sony with its characteristic long ō sound. 31 Furthermore, as
Morita himself often admitted, Sony’s early goal was not to make
runaway profit but to establish a long-term market in the United States. 32
His goal was simply to get Sony up and running in America and to begin
building a positive brand image.
In 1957, Sony found a partner, Delmonico, to distribute goods
out of New York. 33 This endeavor required Morita to adapt to life in New
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York, and more importantly, American business life and culture. To this
end, Morita became especially effective in business confrontations. His
confidence and strong will in negotiations surprised and subverted the
then current stereotype that assumed Japanese businessmen always
avoided direct confrontation. 34
When the powerful American company Union Carbide (UC)
threatened to sue Sony for selling their batteries bundled with Sony’s
radio imports, Morita stood his ground. Facing UC’s agent, he bluntly
pointed out that one battery a radio did not mean anything next to the all
the batteries people would buy to replace it once it went out. The
implication: Sony was creating demands for UC’s batteries, and the
obvious choice was to drop the issue. After that discussion, Union
Carbide dropped the suit. 35
Sony continued to grow its American base throughout the 1960s,
yet it rarely relied on meeting established consumer demands. Instead, as
Morita often explained, the goal from the start was to create new
demands and markets that only Sony’s innovative products could meet. 36
This strategy meshed well with larger market trends as consumer
products after WWII began to transition from saving time to filling it.37
Consequently, Sony built its success around doing just that.
According to business historian and translator John Nathan,
while Morita presented the Walkman concept to his colleagues as
something that had come to him on a whim, the goal was clearly to offset
Sony’s recent losses in the Video Cassette Recorder (VCR) format war.
While there are many accounts of the Walkman’s origin,38 Nathan
reports that the idea was inspired by
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Sony’s master technician Ibuka’s desire to listen to classical music on an
international flight. 39
The formal development of the product was rushed for maximum
market impact, and many of the Walkman components were taken from
existing Sony products. No market studies were done initially. The
whole process was supported entirely by Morita’s personal confidence
and will power. Many at Sony were skeptical at first. But after a month
of stagnant sales, the Walkman took off in August 1979. Japanese sales
were so strong that production was unable to create enough extra
machines for export until 1980. 40
Importantly, the Walkman (and its headphones) were marketed
as youthful, fashionable, and active. Advertising demonstrations were
done in parks to show how everyday hobbies could be mixed with the
Walkman experience. 41 As the Walkman began to dominate the market,
it made itself a central part of international youth culture. As a part of this
new youth culture, the Walkman also made headphones attractive. Sony
carefully associated them with style and energy. 42 Before, headphones
were only associated with medical problems and engineers, not
versatility and leisure.
And yet, in all these new positive associations, it became unclear
whether “made in Japan” was essential or incidental. The Walkman was
designed to be cheap and portable, so as to appeal to students and other
young people. As mentioned, it was marketed as youthful and mobile.
But as Japanese culture and media scholar Koichi Iwabuchi argues, there
was not anything particularly Japanese about this lifestyle. 43 Sony’s
international success lay in its ability to adapt a positive image for Sony
itself that was then only later grafted on to people’s image of Japan. This
39
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can be seen in the success of Akio Morita’s 1986 autobiography, Made in
Japan, which presented Sony’s success, at least in part, as a product of its
Japanese business strategies.
It is also worth stressing that Sony did not fit in well with the rest
of Japan’s corporate system. Sony lies outside of the inner circle of the
“keiretsu,” that is, the formalized cliques of corporations that dominate
Japanese business. 44 Regardless, their international success eventually
earned them certain advantages at home. For instance, Matsushita, their
main domestic rival, has even said they would never let Sony go under,
because Sony had come to represent “the good name of Japanese
electronics” abroad. 45 And yet this sums up the Sony paradox perfectly:
a company completely at home neither in Japan or America that became
the poster child for the positive reputation of Japanese goods.
Despite Sony’s success, Japanese quality became onedimensional. Well into 1990s Japan was often seen as only capable of
producing hardware like VCRs, while software such as the movies on the
tapes inside them remained squarely in the domain of the United States. 46
For example, even with Japanese hardware like Walkmans and VCRs
flooding the American market, by 1985, sixty percent of all VHS tapes in
global circulation were American in origin. 47 However, in the case of
Japanese games system like the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES),
the games inside were increasingly made in Japan as well, and their
runaway success would eventually challenge the notion of hardware-only
Japan. 48
The Nintendo Entertainment System was arguably the most
important piece of Japanese gaming hardware in history. Equally
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important, it was also the vehicle for one of the most influential pieces of
export software Japan had yet produced: Super Mario Bros.
By 1986, after months of small-scale deals in New York,
Nintendo had established a broad enough market for a national American
release of their new game system, alongside its most famous game, Super
Mario. The NES would go on to sell 34 million units in the United States
alone. Super Mario Bros.’s impact went beyond sales figures though. It
inspired the numerous games that followed to emphasize explorations
and complex gameplay: the two qualities that made Super Mario Bros. so
entertaining. More importantly, it helped create the still growing world of
gaming culture, a culture built not only on hardware but also on
software. 49
This culture was born at the popular level. As such, mass market
magazines such as Nintendo Power offer good information about both
gaming culture and people’s relationship to it, but there are limits to such
sources. As Michael Newman relates in Atari Age quoting Lynn Spigel,
popular sources cannot tell us what people, “do, think, or feel” but they
can tell us what people “read, watch, and say.” 50 Yet, since fan
magazines often feed off reader consensus and input such as letters to the
editor, it may also be fair to say that sources like Nintendo Power do in
fact present at least what some people thought and felt. With that caveat,
Nintendo Power stands out as particularly helpful as it offers evidence
not only of how Nintendo presented itself to American audiences, but
also how readers experienced the Nintendo brand.
Mia Consalvo, an expert on video games and game culture,
claims that Nintendo worked hard to strike a balance when presenting
import games, to make sure they were not seen as too different or too
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foreign. 51 She mentions that any conversation about Western perceptions
of Japan must inevitably consider questions of orientalism, such as the
long-standing stereotypes and assumptions that color the West’s
understanding of the East. Yet she nuances these claims by explaining
that “such imaginings are not always negative or false. The realities are
usually much more complex.” 52 An example of this complexity shows up
on the cover of Issue Five of Nintendo Power: a blue-eyed ninja
representing the top story, a new game called Ninja Gaiden. 53
While cultural critics might find it easy to slight an image like
this, Consalvo argues that simple anti-orientalist readings of games are
extremely limiting, and often forget that depicting difference does not
have to be othering or negative. 54 With Nintendo Power’s coverage of
Ninja Gaiden, this seems to hold true. For while it exploits the simple
“cool factor” of ninjas and magic, it portrays the main character, with an
obviously foreign name, Ryu, positively.
Additionally, an authentic Japanese language subtitle is included under
the English one. According to the article, “Ryu is the ultimate Ninja”
and as such he is portrayed as heroic and competent. 55 Interestingly,
Japan is never mentioned explicitly in his back story, only that Ryu is
from the very Japanese sounding “Hayabusa clan.” 56
Equally odd, page 28 of the article claims no one knows the true
origin of the ninja arts. It suggests they might have evolved from the
training of ancient Chinese monks while others believe it was developed
in Japan 500 years ago, but mystery and not Japanese culture is
51
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emphasized. The emphasis remains more focused on difference itself as
something fun and exotic rather than on relating any specific culture’s
history. 57 In these ways, Nintendo distances
the game from reading as bluntly Japanese.
In other early issues, foreign themes are presented with plenty of
Americanization. While Issue One’s coverage of the game Double
Dragon also includes a Japanese language subtitle, its meaning or the
fact it is Japanese is not explained to the reader. So while the hero, Billy
Lee, is depicted as heroically-built with a noticeably Asian face, all
readers learn about him is that he is a martial arts expert determined to
save his girlfriend. Of his nationality, nothing is said. 58 Instead, the
advertisement focuses on communicating excitement, action, and
grittiness: the qualities of a good action game.
Later in the same issue, an ad for the action game Contra shows
two men back to back with assault rifles firing away. While one appears
white, and the other Asian, nothing else is suggested about them except
that they are “guerilla warriors” on a mission to stop an alien onslaught
that started in New Zealand. 59 While admittedly, early games such as
Double Dragon and Contra were not technically sophisticated enough to
support dense stories within the gameplay itself, many early Nintendo
Power articles existed solely to give players the narrative background the
games could not provide for themselves. In these articles, the Japanese
companies Technos, Tecmo, and Konami, all made noticeable choices to
present heroes whose charisma and competence mattered more than their
ambiguous origins.
Here it is important to note that this process worked both ways.
In the final pages of Issue One of Nintendo Power, the editor Howard
Phillips writes a special column about the runaway success of the game
57
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Dragon Quest in Japan. He tells readers that oddly enough, ninjas and
samurai are falling out of style in Japan. Instead, games about medieval
swordplay and sorcery with a western flavor are enjoying increasing
success. He notes that Dragon Quest’s success makes sense, as it
delivers, “good graphics, good programming, and good sound all in one
single game.” Yet, he wonders why “American born sword and magic
games” are “making such a splash” in Japan. (Though created by the
Japanese company Enix, Dragon Quest did in fact resemble many
American role-playing games.) He then teases readers to look out to see
if and when Nintendo might bring the game to the United States. 60
As Dragon Quest did, upon its eventual American release as
Dragon Warrior, many games actually came out of a three-stage
exchange, in which American concepts reached Japan only to be sent
back over to the United States. In the case of Konami’s Castlevania
series of vampire-hunting adventure games, this is exactly what appears
to have happened. On the front cover of Issue Two, the hero of the
Castlevania series, Simon Belmont, is depicted as a classic
Western medieval hero armed with Dracula’s decapitated head in his
grip. 61 In the coinciding article, vaguely Shakespearean language is used
to introduce Simon and his quest to hunt and destroy Dracula. 62 By
working with and adapting well-known Western legends and tropes, the
Japanese company Konami was pre-positioned to present its game to an
understanding audience.
Nintendo Power also provides several interesting examples of
how video games functioned in the hardware vs. software dynamic of
Japanese imports, as alluded to earlier. In fact, video games themselves
60
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were one of the central turning points in this regard. But in the
beginning, it seems Nintendo first wanted to prove to its American
market that the game console and its accessories, the hardware, were
themselves top notch.
In the earliest issues of Nintendo Power, much of its limited ad
space went to offers for game controllers and accessories, items clearly in
the hardware camp. For example, on the back cover of Issue Two, an ad
reads “Power Tools” and shows a tool box of different Nintendo licensed
controllers. The rest of the text boasts how players will experience total
control with these products with the one exception being, “out of control
high scores”. Alongside the commercial push of this extra hardware,
early issues also introduced to readers “the Nintendo seal of quality.” 63
The back cover of Issue Four tells reader plainly, “Look for the Nintendo
Seal,” then adds “It’s your guarantee that you’ve pushed the button for
top-playing fun and games – only from Nintendo.” In the next issue, the
back cover goes further “If it’s [the seal’s] not there, it’s not backed by
Nintendo…This seal is our pledge of top quality.” Another advertisement
in Issue Four entitled “Power Supply” features a shelf of Nintendo
controllers with lightning arcing around them. Though some of the
goods shown have been licensed off to third party sellers, text at the
bottom reassures readers, “each one carries the quality seal that tells you
it’s part of the Nintendo family.” 64 The connection Nintendo Power
wanted its early readers to make was clear: Nintendo meant quality
hardware.
Five years later in 1993’s Issue Fifty Four, this trend continues.
On pages 84-85, a sneak peak style article gives the reader a look at
Nintendo’s new upcoming game system dubbed “Project Reality.” It
announces that Nintendo would be partnering with Silicon Graphics, Inc.
63
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(an American company). 65 At that moment, Nintendo seemed to be
bound by the then-current trend of Japanese companies having to rely on
American companies to develop games. However, over the following
years this dynamic would be challenged by Japan’s ever-increasing
competence in the world of game making, as Schodt deftly observed. 66
The June 1996 issue of Nintendo Power featured a 33-page mega
feature on the Nintendo 64 (N64), the system previously advertised as
Project Reality. From the start, the article makes it clear that the
Nintendo 64 is worth the reader’s time and money not because of
technicalities, but because of the sheer fun packed in the software
available for it. While boasting that when it comes to the N64’s
hardware, “Let’s face it, it’s incredible,” fans are reminded, “You don’t
buy a system because it has z-buffering, you buy it for the games.” 67
Yet above all, the gaming experience itself as created by both
hardware and software enjoys the greatest attention. In a special standout quote box, Nintendo executive, Minoru Arakawa claims that “you
can see the difference from the first moment you plug in Super Mario
64.” 68 Then, almost as if to directly deliver on Nintendo of America
Vice President Howard Lincoln’s earlier comment that “Project Reality
dissolves the current limits of video play, causing the world to challenge
its notion of what a video game can be,” 69 the article turns to several
international companies slated to bring high quality software to the N64.
Explaining that the N64 has attracted talent from Japan, America,
and Europe, the article presents a globalized network of game makers
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and computer scientists all centered around and driven by Nintendo’s
effort to give consumers the absolute best. In this network, Japan
suddenly stands as an equal, as the flagship software for the system,
Super Mario 64, is explicitly linked to Japanese creator Shigero
Miyamoto. Readers are told that Super Mario 64 caused a sensation at
the “Shoshinkai” trade show, as fans around the world applauded its
premier and that it represents, “nothing less than a revolution in
games.” 70 It must also be noted how confident Nintendo Power had
become with exposing its readers to linguistically difficult and obviously
Japanese names and places. Unlike in 1988, readers are expected to be
excited, not confused, by these names, for Japan has become a creator of
great games. Unlike Ryu the blue-eyed ninja, these are real people and
places that readers now know had a direct hand in the creation of their
favorite games. “Made in Japan” has been made noticeable because now
it was positive.
While video games were Japan’s first real chance at exporting
quality software, they were also then associated with youth culture more
than general culture. But in the 1990s, Japan would get a chance to
export into a market that touched all Americans: Baseball. In 1995,
Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles began serving sushi in honor of their
rising rookie, the Japanese player Hideo Nomo. 71
In this way, international baseball had come full circle because
forty-six years ago, in 1949, an American team called the San Francisco
Seals had travelled to Japan as part of a goodwill mission during the
American occupation. 72 In addition to the entertainment itself, each
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game also brought Japanese fans into contact with American ballpark
food. According to Japanese American sports historian GuthrieShimazu, Coca-Cola and popcorn provided more than new flavors to the
Japanese. They were symbols of democracy and a prosperous American
life style. 73
In 1995 many wondered what pieces of Japan Nomo would bring
with him. However, in the face of intense press attention, Nomo grew
frustrated with being a curiosity, telling Sports Illustrated in May of
1995, “The American interest in me is because I’m from Japan. Now I’d
like to let them know I can compete on this level as myself, as Hideo
Nomo.” 74 Just like Sony and Nintendo, Nomo was determined to define
his brand by quality above anything else.
An extended length story in the LA times from September 17,
1995 highlighted the tension between American media’s fascination with
Nomo’s Japanese identity and Nomo’s own preference to shrug it off.
The article begins with a few examples of Nomo’s successful
assimilation into American culture. Sports writer Bob Nightingale
mentions that Nomo takes special pride in his driver’s license, in being
able to order “the usual” at his favorite pizza place, and in going to
Venice Beach with his wife and young son. The article often returns to
Nomo’s many Japanese fans and his difficult relationship with the
Japanese press. Quoting the Japanese serial, Sports Nippon Newspaper,
the article mentions that back in Japan, Nomo had become more famous
than the legendary home run king Sudaharu. Oh, perhaps even than
Prime Minister Murayama. 75
In addition, Nomo’s American success was seen as a much
needed good news amidst domestic turmoil. As Nomo’s interpreter Kent
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Brown related, “My friends from Japan tell me, ‘Things are not going
good. We have recession, we have terrorists…in our subway, but you
know something, we still have Nomo.’” 76 In this way Nomo’s press
reception created a paradox, where his legitimacy as a player in MLB
kept being tied back to his warm following in Japan. While the article
bluntly states that Nomo proves Japanese players can finally compete in
the Major Leagues, mentioning that American scouts are already looking
for the next Nomo, it also made it difficult for Nomo to represent himself
without representing his country.
Sports historians Guttman and Thompson emphasize Japan’s
long-term baseball ambition to be able to compete as equals with the
United States. Yet, writing in 2001, they claim, “that no student of the
game believes this has happened.” They did, however, credit Nomo as a
“harbinger” of Japanese progress to come. 77 That progress would come
in the form of Ichiro
Suzuki.
In a Seattle Times articles from November 10, 2000 covering
Ichiro’s likely entry into the MLB, there is a noticeable difference in tone
from Nomo debut 7 years earlier. For one, there is no question that
Ichiro is capable of playing excellent baseball. While the Dodgers were
previously described as taking a gamble on Nomo, 78 the Mariners
reportedly threw “smart” money at the chance to field Ichiro. The article
even references Nintendo’s earlier buyout of the Mariners, saying, “Japan
has saved the Mariners once, perhaps it can do it again.”
In addition to greater confidence in his skill, Ichiro also seemed
to have enjoyed a little bit more room to define himself by his play
instead his nationality. As Mariner executives explained to the Seattle
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Times, they would have been interested in him whether he was from
“Brooklyn or Borneo.” What mattered was that he could play well, and
he didn’t cost them a draft pick.
Alluding to previous tensions over Nintendo’s ownership of the
Mariner franchise, the article also mentions that people “feared the club
would be moved to Tokyo or, worse yet, serve sushi at the ball park.”
The article then jokes about how the sushi part came true, and how the
Mariners had become the most popular team in Japan, and yet, as the
article emphasizes, they still play in the United States. Overall, the
article sends a mixed message. In one part it argues that Japanese
ownership of the Mariners had changed more about Japanese baseball
than it had changed Seattle. It finishes by mentioning that Suzuki
represents a new kind of player for Japan, who negotiates and demands
better conditions and pay. “They’ve become more like Americans, while
Seattle has become more like Japan.” 79 In this way, like Sony and
Nintendo, Ichiro didn’t mind a bit of Americanization in order to do his
job.
A later Seattle Times story from May 3, 2001, covering Ichiro’s
first MLB game facing Hideo Nomo, reveals an additional concern of the
time, that the MLB was becoming too attractive to strong Japanese
players. While Japanese commentator Poncho Ito admitted that Nomo
versus Ichiro was the greatest story in his career since Nomo’s own
debut, another Japanese voice, Kota Ishijima openly worried that Japan
was becoming a mere feeder system for the MLB, a de facto minor
league like Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic. So, while the
Nomo-Ichiro face off confirmed that there was “no question that the
inferiority Japan has felt as a baseball playing nation eased a bit,” the
article has less confidence that it had or ever would go away completely.
The article closes, “On a night when cameras clicked and a Japanese flag
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flew high in right field, it was hard to tell whether this was the beginning,
or the end.” 80
More recently, excitement over Japanese Pitcher Shohei Otani, 81 as well
as the Nintendo Switch’s (along with its quality games) record breaking
sales, 82 suggest the success story of Japanese imports in America is far
from over. It is to be seen whether adaptation will be forever necessary,
or if the perceived quality of Japanese goods will continue indefinitely.
Yet up until now, Japanese imports have always been connected to these
ideas, whether seen in Godzilla and Astro Boy’s history of adaptation,
the quality first strategies of Sony and Nomo, or the international
identity of Nintendo and Ichiro. Japanese goods and services succeeded
in post-war America because they prioritized adaptation and quality
over national identity and in doing so elevated what it meant to be
“made in Japan.” Their example may yet inspire other rising
economies, as their history deepens our understanding of globalization.
At the very least, their story helps show how Japanese imports, in a
generation’s time, went from being ignored or feared to an integral part
of American life and culture.
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